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Abstract 
 
The paper features one of the most calling interrelation in today’s pension universe, 
namely the interplay between regulatory activity and future pensioners’ wealth. The 
paper attempts to explore this tradeoff, casting a closer glance solely at portfolio-related 
regulatory measures and investment performance of pension plans. The effort to classify 
and rank OECD regulatory regimes is made, which is not straightforward given the 
variety of unique approaches to regulation in this respect. Afterwards, a simple cross-
section model is run that displays how the strictness of oversight affects the risk-return 
profile of pension instruments. The analysis embraces the 2001 to 2012 period, as this the 
period for which detailed OECD statistics are available. Conclusion and suggestions for 
further investigation tie up the article. 
 
Keywords: pension funds regulation, pension funds performance, portfolio-related regulation, 
regulatory impact 
 
1. Introduction 
Following the recent financial crisis, and taking into account the rather gloomy demographic 
outlook of many developed societies, safety net policies are due to be fundamentally restructured. 
Pension systems are one of the most essential elements of these policies, yet also one of the most 
perplexing for various social planners. The level of regulatory strictness in this domain varies 
substantially among countries and the debate is nowhere near consensus on whether the ever-
increasing stock of regulation leaves the societies better off. The regulatory mix forged by 
authorities is abundant and tends to embrace fund’s corporate governance, disclosure 
requirements and performance presentation, minimum required performance, fees and 
commissions, rules of valuation as well as any other legal, administrative and operational factors. 
It has to be noted that the relative importance of pension funds industry, expressed as a 
percentage of assets against the GDP, varies heavily from country to country, reaching or 
exceeding 100 percent in the Netherlands, Iceland, Switzerland or the United Kingdom, while 
comprising only a tiny fraction of national accounts in France, Greece, Luxembourg or Slovenia. 
This, along with other macroeconomic, financial sector or institutional factors, many of which 
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were studied by Musalem and Pasquini (Musalem and Pasquini 2012), might determine the level 
of awareness that policy makers attach to the underlying problem. 
This paper is interested solely in the portfolio-related regulations
1
 and the reason for its 
inspection is twofold. First, they are most relevant from the perspective of funds’ beneficiaries, 
who are presumably most concerned with the rate of return and risk exposures of investment 
vehicles, and not so much with other funds’ characteristics. Second, despite the number of 
complexities, they are fairly tangible. On the whole, the dichotomy prevails. The Anglo-Saxon 
investment culture allows for more liberal stance based on the so-called prudent man rule or on 
the general requirement of diversification, whereas the oversight is much sterner in continental 
Europe and often resorts to explicit quantitative restriction (Antolin 2008, 5). There are quite a 
few exceptions to this cliché, though.  
The quantitative restrictions are introduced on assets believed to be vulnerable to high volatility, 
insufficient liquidity and high investment risk. This often seems to be assessed on a standalone 
basis, whereas investments should rather be seen in the context of the whole portfolio, where 
risks might cancel out or be effectively diversified. Therefore, the research question is whether 
the state institutions’ legislation acts in the best interest of an investor2, maximizing her risk-
return profile (in other words: risk-adjusted return). The hypothesis that fueled the research 
process was that repressive regulation restricts pension funds from taking the full advantage of 
the opportunities the market offers, thus deteriorating the value delivered to investors. Following 
this chapter, the brief literature review is made, as well as the theoretical justification 
demonstrating the feasibility of this study. The last but one section displays and discusses the 
preliminary results of econometric modeling. The next steps are enumerated in the last chapter, 
along with conclusions. 
The goal of the paper is to lay foundations for further analysis on whether the conventional 
understanding of prudent regulation is in the best interest of future pensioners. The simple check 
is whether the rigorous oversight brings the indented value added. 
2. Literature review and theoretical foundations 
Not much of the existing literature has explicitly raised the tradeoff between constraints to 
portfolio construction and the risk-return profile of the pertinent portfolios. Few of relevant 
examples include Davis (1998; 2001; 2002), Srinivas and Yermo (1999), Srinivas, Whitehouse, 
and Yermo (2000), Davis and Hu (2008), Tapia (2008), Bohl, Lischewski, and Voronkova 
(2010), Love et al. (2011), Bijapur et al. (2012), Hribernik and Jakopanec (2012), Musalem and 
Pasquini (2012), Shi and Werker (2012), Xiao and Xiao (2012) and particularly Boon et al. 
(2013). The latter will serve here as a rough point of departure for the methodology used. There is 
also a relatively broad selection of the papers written in Spanish which deal with the pension 
systems that were established in the Latin America, constituting a vital element of the economic 
debate in this part of the world. Nevertheless, it has to be explicitly emphasized that there is still a 
                                                          
1
 Notions such as portfolio regulation, investment restrictions or portfolio restrictions will be used interchangeably 
with portfolio-related regulation throughout the paper. 
2
 Given that funded pension schemes are obligatory in many countries, the term “investor” may equally well be 
phrased as “citizen”. Notions such as future pensioners, retirees or beneficiaries will be also used interchangeably 
with „investors” throughout the paper. 
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noticeable deficit in the field of broad-based, empirical and methodologically sound research that 
explores the link between asset restrictions and risk-adjusted performance. 
Although one may assume that the only goal of the pension regulatory body should be to 
maximize the fund beneficiary’s expected payoff, it needs to be recognized at this point that 
portfolio-related regulatory measures may also be backed by some auxiliary intentions other than 
this. One possible motivation might be the preoccupation with supporting domestic capital 
markets (Kowalewski 2010), by capping the allowed investment in foreign securities. Moreover, 
as it was indicated by Thomas, Spataro, and Mathew (2013) for OECD countries, there is a 
negative and statistically significant relationship between the share of pension funds’ assets 
invested in stocks and stock market volatility, which means that the activity of pension funds 
serves as a reliable market stabilizer. Similar inferences may be drawn from Muller et al. (2012). 
On another note, while regulations should only apply to this fraction of pension funds that are 
collected from citizens on an obligatory basis by state or state-owned entity (see Vittas 1998, 3–
4), this is not always the case. As Davis (2001, 17) instructs, excessive regulatory burdens carry 
the risk of discouraging pension providers in a voluntary environment. Thus, the very existence 
of regulation may give birth to uninvited (and hardly quantifiable) side effects. 
One of the recent papers that embraces the interrelation between regulation and return is that of 
Boon et al. (2013). Three dimensions of regulatory activity were put under scrutiny: investment 
restrictions, minimum performance or benefit guarantee, and the type of supervising authority. In 
general, they found no significant impact of regulatory strictness on pension funds’ investment 
performance. Only after the incorporation of macroeconomic dummies, it turned out that 
stringent portfolio limits may be considered harmful in emerging market economies, as contrary 
to advanced economies. Despite having found no convincing conclusion, Boon et al. believe that 
it is due to data-related reasons (quality, comparability across countries, and the particular time 
period sampled). 
There are several points of critique that might be raised with regard to the methodology used in 
Boon et al. First, the identification of investment restriction is not very sophisticated. They are 
measured “by counting the number of asset classes and subclasses in which a quantitative limit 
exists” (Boon et al. 2013, 5), disregarding the character of an asset class and the depth of the 
restriction. Second, when portfolio restrictions cannot be reconciled with the analogous data on 
performance, which is typical for countries with multiple pension schemes, the authors derived a 
median of the asset allocation limits, which is quite a naïve approach that may lead to erroneous 
inferences. Third, the data on pension funds’ performance are taken from multiple sources 
(OECD, FIAP
3
 and AIOS
4
), which adds up to the risk of losing data consistency as not only 
different countries report incompatibly to data aggregators, but also these institutions follow 
disparate performance presentation regimes. However, this last caveat is somehow excusable, as 
the overarching goal was to enrich the feeble data set. 
Furthermore, Musalem and Pasquini (2012) have built an extensive data set with an intention to 
untangle the impact of a broad set of variables on pension plans’ performance and volatility. The 
                                                          
3
 La Federación Internacional de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (International Federation of Pension Fund 
Administrators). 
4
 La Asociación Internacional de Organismos de Supervisión de Fondos de Pensiones (International Association of 
Supervisory Organisms of Pension Funds). 
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shortcoming of their paper is that they did not manage to merge return and volatility into a single 
dependent variable. Out of the variables that are aligned with the goals of this paper, the “foreign 
investment limit” is interesting. It was found insignificant in the determination of returns, but 
proved moderately useful in determining their standard deviations. The less strict the constraints 
on foreign investment, the bigger volatility. Nevertheless, the authors treat this particular finding 
as preliminary. Tapia (2008) developed a similar study to Musalem and Pasquini, but he failed to 
execute econometric analysis in any form in order to inspect the link between investment 
restrictions and performance. 
Another exceptionally useful paper is the one of Bijapur, Croci, and Zaidi (2012) where asset 
regulations levied on life insurance companies are inspected. The accessibility of life insurance 
data is considerably better than the accessibility of pension funds statistics, as the authors 
succeeded in gathering more than 2,000 observations, which paved the way for a robust 
modeling. In essence, explicit investment limits on particular asset classes have been found to 
impede portfolio diversification and lead to significantly lower risk-adjusted returns. Moreover, 
the jurisdictions that imposed the most repressive caps on asset allocation fare the worst. 
In their empirical paper based on the data provided by two Slovenian pension funds, Hribernik 
and Jakopanec (2012) insist that the key in managing pension investment scheme lies in the 
appropriate matching of assets and liabilities in terms of duration, profitability and riskiness. The 
authors doubt that restrictions on investments are needed as long as investment managers are 
capable of prudently handling the underlying assets. 
Bohl, Lischewski, and Voronkova (2010) have performed a comparative analysis of Polish and 
Hungarian pension funds, while paying attention to some elements of regulatory and 
macroeconomic frameworks. They found that the investment restrictions in Hungary have 
translated to an excessive investment into government securities, and this effect was not so much 
pronounced in Poland. The theoretical contribution of this paper lies in recognizing the vital part 
played by the domestic capital market in introducing pension reforms. The underperformance of 
Hungarian investment programs with relation to Polish ones was associated with inferior size and 
liquidity of the equity market. The reason for including various indicators related to capital 
markets seems generally well-grounded. It is rather clear that pension funds refine their portfolios 
in reaction to what happens in the broad markets. As Bikker, Broeders, and de Dreu (2010) state, 
“investment policies of pension funds are partially driven by the cyclical performance of the 
stock market”. Also, interestingly, they found that Dutch pension funds respond asymmetrically 
to equity market shocks and rebalance their portfolios more decisively in downturns rather than 
upturns. There are of course more papers that point out the link between financial market turmoil 
and deteriorated performance of pension plans (Leiner-Killinger, Nickel, and Slavík 2010). 
Davis and Hu (2008) make an interesting comparison of broadly defined investment regimes of 
Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. Despite the prevailing prudent man rule, 
Canadian pension funds are still subject to some residual quantitative restrictions, which are not 
present in the other two states. Crunching the very long data series of 1966-2006, the authors 
argue that Canadian funds notoriously underperformed their benchmarks. Concurrently, US funds 
achieved better results and UK funds actually almost always outperformed their target rates of 
return. Although the results do not always lend support to their hypothesis, the authors are 
convinced that this gap in performance can be attributed to portfolio restrictions. Thus, they make 
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a claim in favor of elimination of all outstanding quantitative regulations in Canada. This verdict 
stays in line with the earlier findings of Davis (2002), where he had maintained that quantitative 
restriction are desirable only “in certain circumstances that may hold temporarily in emerging 
market economies”. Similarly, Davis (2001) indicates that there is a strong case for pension funds 
to follow prudent man approach, although both of the considered approaches seek to guarantee 
proper diversification. 
An interesting paper on the consequences of the increased interest of pension funds in high-
quality long bonds was published by Xiao and Xiao (2012). Using econometric techniques, they 
indicate that the supply of this sub-class of bonds may soon turn out to be insufficient, which 
would result in soaring the cost of delivering pensions. This shows that it is systemically 
dangerous if pension funds exhibit excess prudence, a sign of which is the flight into safe bonds. 
This excess prudence may possibly be exacerbated by the regulatory zeal. 
Srinivas and Yermo (1999), as well as Srinivas, Whitehouse, and Yermo (2000) call attention to 
the pension plans suspected of having a tendency to benchmark one against the other. The chain 
of events that they replicate in a paper starts with the image of governments striving to win 
legitimacy for the newly created pension funds. The false vision was that draconian regulations 
effectively ensure maximum returns. As a matter of fact, the regulatory overkill has only caused 
pension funds’ portfolios to be practically indistinguishable, as the regulation provided hardly 
any incentive for pension funds to differentiate by excelling in investment management. 
Therefore, the authors called for the liberalization of portfolio requirements, but it mostly 
remained a lone voice in the wilderness. 
Out of theoretical papers, one is worth the attention. Shi and Werker (2012) confirm that 
institutional investors constrained by asset regulation tend to invest more in the risk-free 
instruments than unconstrained investors. The motivation behind their research is the observation 
that the regulatory horizon does not correspond to the institutional investors’ investment horizon, 
being usually much longer, which is sub-optimal in terms of performance. 
This paper sets foundations for further analysis concerning enriching pension funds’ portfolios 
with more alternative assets. While there is no official definition of what alternative assets 
comprise, hedge funds, private equity and venture capital, commodities, real estate as well as 
infrastructure investments typically fall into this category (Laboul and Della Croce 2013, 4 
footnote). Particularly, as Barber and Wang (2013) indicated in their recent study, top US 
educational endowments
5
 perform well relative to public stock and bond benchmarks because of 
large allocations to alternative investments. These allocations explain the majority of the superior 
financial result of top-performing vehicles in the last two decades. By the same token, 
Hoevenaars et al. (2008, 2967) point out that the alternative asset classes add value for long-term 
investors, as they have a term structure of risk that by and large overlaps a term structure of 
pension fund’s risk. Pension funds are, by their nature, the long-term oriented institutions and 
since their liabilities exhibit the longest duration in the market (Blake 1999), so should their 
assets. Rose and Seligman (Rose and Seligman 2013) indicate in their primary study that the 
beta-driven motivation of investments in alternatives (i.e. diversification) is now more common 
than alpha-driven (i.e. earning excess returns). On the contrary, Robertson and Wielezynski 
                                                          
5
 A type of institutional investor that is relatively similar to pension funds with regard to investment horizons. 
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(2008) show that whereas the investment returns of pension plans with allocations in alternative 
assets of at least 10 percent is superior, they insist that it comes with a significantly and 
consistently higher standard deviation. All in all, no significant differences in risk-adjusted 
returns is seen. However, their sample is very limited, as it comprises only 39 pension plans in a 
timespan of unceased prosperity from 2002 to 2006. There is also a discussion on possible 
inclusion of derivatives into pension portfolios (Cui, Oldenkamp, and Vellekoop 2013). 
Business research suggests that hypothetical strategies that include alternative securities may be 
superior to conventional portfolios. For example, the so-called 60/30/10 (i.e. 60% equity, 30% 
bonds, 10% alternatives) allocations are typically superior to conventional 60/40 (i.e. 60% equity, 
40% bonds) allocation. The quarterly data for the period 1990-2010 indicate that while S&P 
Total Return Index earned 9.6% annually, private equity reached 14.3% and hedge funds – 11.9% 
(PwC 2012). Taking the longer stream of data, while S&P 500 offered an annual expected return 
of 9.92% with a standard deviation of 13.98% in the period from 1990 to September 2008, hedge 
funds turned out to exceed these numbers. Even funds of funds displayed only a slightly lower 
annual return of 8.97%, but with a tremendously lower volatility (standard deviation of 5.78%). 
This gave a Sharpe ratio of 0.88 as compared with 0.43 for S&P 500 and 0.45 for 10-Year U.S. 
Treasury (Anson and CAIA Association 2009, 153). 
3. Results 
3.1 Data 
All private pensions’ statistics come from the Global Pension Statistics database run by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which seems to also have 
the broadest and the deepest insight into the investment-related regulations of pension funds. 
Since 2001, the OECD publishes the survey of investment regulations
6
 (Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 2013) , which is a helpful tool in reducing the paucity 
of data. However, the struggle for comparability is not over. First, the approaches or even 
philosophies of regulations are extremely heterogeneous. The strictness of regulatory burden may 
not be compared straightforwardly between countries, mainly due to the fact that the complexities 
of particular pension systems make each of them quite unique (see Malone 1999, 57; Stojanović 
and Krišto 2013). Second, it is sometimes not better with performance reporting. For instance, the 
U.S. market, representing most pension assets under management but also most lax approach to 
regulation, cannot be covered in this study due to the scarcity of pension fund data (Bauer and 
Frehen 2007). Moreover, restrictions on investing future pensioners’ assets in hedge funds or 
private equity differ by U.S. state (Rose and Seligman 2013, 5). An apparent conclusion is that 
there is a clear tie between the strictness of regulation and the available database on pension 
funds. One can have both or none. 
What adds up to the difficulty of comparing various regimes is the lack of consensus in 
interpretation of certain variables. Several dummies from Antolin (2008) on mandatory/voluntary 
or defined benefit/defined contribution do not match the dummies of Musalem and Pasquini 
(2012) for the analogous periods. Even worse, the discord is on more fundamental issues. While 
                                                          
6
 The time range of the surveys spans from 2001 to 2012, but there was no survey for 2005. Therefore, the proxies 
for 2005 regulations are present in the model only if the regulations for 2004 and 2006 are identical, which is the 
indicator of stable regulatory environment in these days. 
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Canada seems to be an unrestricted paradise for portfolio managers, as seen from OECD 
statistics, Davis and Hu (2008) criticize this country for the departure from prudent man rule, 
raising both theoretical and empirical arguments for its superiority as compared with quantitative 
asset restrictions.  
Pension statistics have been assembled only since recently, hence the full panel analysis would 
not be very fruitful and would probably fail in exhibiting any kind of trend. Particularly, given 
the fact that policy shocks (i.e. modifications of pension scheme’s asset allocation rules) are 
rather rare and ascribing appropriate lags would be problematic. This, however, does not shut the 
door before full panel analysis to be made in the future. 
The data summary is presented in Table 1 and descriptive statistics follow in Table 2. 
The approach to rank regulatory regimes is shown in the Appendix. In brief, countries that set 
caps on particular asset classes at reasonable levels are not penalized for regulation (0.0). 
However, if the limits are stricter than the arbitrarily assumed threshold, a fine is ascribed to this 
jurisdiction (0.5). If a given asset class is not available for investment, a jurisdiction gets full 
penalty (1.0). 
The OECD pension plans’ investment performance is assessed by two versions of the Sharpe 
ratio (consult Table 1 for more information) and by the Sortino ratio. The Sharpe ratio is a well-
established metrics with a long track record in the investment industry. Essentially, it measures 
the excess return per unit of deviation in an investment program. The generic formula for the 
Sharpe ratio is therefore: 
             
             
                        
 
                            
                        
 
Contrary to the Sharpe ratio, the Sortino ratio proposed as an alternative in this paper, does not 
have academic roots, as it was developed by the investment industry. The key modification that 
the Sortino ratio introduces in gauging risk-adjusted returns is that it penalizes the investment 
program solely for the negative (below target) volatility. Thus, it ignores the upside volatility on 
the grounds that it is clearly welcomed by investors. Whereas the Sharpe ratio of an investment 
program has little direct meaning when not benchmarked against its peers, the value of the 
Sortino ratio is even less interpretable on a standalone basis. There are several competing 
methods of computing this ratio. The generic formula is: 
              
                              
             
 
The different approaches concern the calculation of the denominator, i.e. the downside risk. In 
this paper, the square root of the 2nd lower partial moment is applied for this purpose: 
              √
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where: 
 ( )                            
 ( )                            
The Sortino ratio has many virtues, although it is much more difficult to calculate (Rollinger and 
Hoffman 2013), what presumably translates to its limited use. Nevertheless, it is very well 
aligned with the objectives of this paper, since it is indeed not intended to penalize those pension 
fund regimes that exhibit excess, but positive volatility. 
For the sake of this model, the risk-free rate embodied by the 10-year government bond yields is 
used as the risk-free rate in the Sharpe ratio formula and as the target return in the Sortino ratio 
formula. All returns are nominal. 
As far as possible, the series are assembled using a single source to maximize the odds for 
comparability and consistency. This, however, does not make a seamless data set. The 
methodological problems are overwhelming. To name only few: 
 The availability of gross investment income variable was insufficient, therefore the 
variable taken is net investment income, which is before tax, but – unfortunately - after deduction 
of investment management costs. This may contaminate the actual relationship between 
regulation and pure play performance. 
 Many countries covered by the OECD statistical database do not differentiate returns by 
type of investment regime (e.g. defined benefit vs. defined contribution or mandatory vs. 
voluntary). Simultaneously, they usually do so when reporting investment restrictions. As a 
result, matching regulations with returns and volatilities is practically unfeasible in some 
jurisdictions. Due to these difficulties, several countries must have been excluded from the 
analysis.
7
 When in doubt, Boon et al. (2013) used a median. This, however, seems to be an 
oversimplification. 
This is compounded with numerous minor problems like different valuation methods or blank or 
unclear fields in the investment restriction surveys. After adjustments, the volume of sound and 
reliable data is even more limited, which is rather unsatisfying given short and only annual time 
series. 
3.2 Regressions 
Caps on particular asset classes were not significant when introduced to the model individually. 
Therefore, two synthetic variables were created: reg_agg_1 and reg_agg-2. Basically, reg_agg_1 
sums up the penalties a jurisdiction received for restricting asset classes that are considered risky 
(equity, real estate, investment funds
8
 and a global limit for foreign investments). On the 
                                                          
7
 Data on Finland (2007-2012), Germany, Luxembourg (2007-2012) and Portugal (2007-2012) were not used in the 
model. Although similar reservations appeared with regard to Estonia, Poland and Slovakia, these data have not been 
excluded, as it is known that the alternative pension systems comprise an insignificant proportion of the total asset 
allocation. Furthermore, although two pension investment programs exist in Hungary (mandatory and voluntary), the 
applicable regulatory frameworks are by and large identical. 
8
 The “investment funds” component of reg_agg_1 was calculated as a mean of penalties ascribed to a jurisdiction in 
categories “private investment funds” and “retail investment funds”. 
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contrary, reg_agg_2 aggregates the caps levied upon less risky asset classes: bonds and deposits. 
In consequence, the reg_agg_1 adopts the values from 0 to 4, and reg_agg_2 adopts the values 
from 0 to 2 (practically, the maximum is 0.5). The bigger their numerical representation, the more 
restrictive the regulatory policy is.  
The results of simple OLS regressions are presented in Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5. When the 
Sharpe ratio (either the one based on 3-year volatility or the one based on all-sample volatility) is 
used as the dependent variable, the reg_agg_1 is significant if included singly. Unfortunately, its 
coefficient is positive which means that stricter regulatory environments explain superior risk-
adjusted returns. This is in conflict with the theory. However, after the inclusion of 
macroeconomic controls, the significance of reg_agg_1 fades out. Instead, the performance of 
domestic equity market and the domestic equity market’s liquidity become significant 
explanatory variables (both with positive coefficients in the first specification and negative in the 
second specification, with the latter result being rather puzzling). Additionally, when the Sortino 
ratio serves as the explained variable, recession dummy and liquidity are significant and come 
with the right sign. The risk-free rate is also significant, but exhibits a positive coefficient, which 
is not very convincing. 
Generally, a refinement of the model where the dependent variable is the Sortino ratio, which 
discriminates between up and down volatility, turns out to be unsuccessful at this point.  
The coefficients, given the way variables were constructed, are not directly interpretable. They 
solely indicate whether the increased drill leads funds to be better off or worse off. 
The reported R-squareds are low, but this is not untypical for this kind of study. Moreover, the 
emphasis here is put on determining significant regressors first. The unobserved variation is 
thought to be mostly due to manager skill and ignored macroeconomic factors. Moreover, in this 
study the benchmark for investment returns is the risk-free rate only. It is probable that after 
incorporating relevant benchmarks for all asset classes the average Sharpe ratio would oscillate 
around zero or even be negative. As for now, we adopt a beneficiary’s perspective who is 
generally not interested by how much their pension plans beat the benchmark, but rather by how 
much they beat the inflation.  
4. Conclusions, limitations and avenues for further research 
With the current specifications and limited amount of data input, no convincing relationships may 
be heralded. The synthetic variable computed in order to account for the regulatory strictness 
with regard to allocations in risky assets was not significant when other macroeconomic variables 
were also incorporated. Various macroeconomic variables, such as recession, equity market 
performance, liquidity on the equity market and the risk-free rate, proved significant in at least 
one specification. Nevertheless, signs of the accompanying coefficients sometimes happened to 
be counter-intuitive. In sum, despite the fairly supportive evidence of both theoretical and 
empirical literature, unravelling the elements of regulatory framework that significantly 
deteriorate risk-adjusted investment returns of pension funds remains problematic. The 
conclusive research papers that have been published so far in this area usually based on well-
reported data for relatively small number of jurisdictions. Seemingly, accounting for the vast 
heterogeneity present in the OECD member states is a bit more challenging endeavor. 
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The irremovable limitation of this study comes from – what has already been mentioned – the 
heterogeneity of the lines along which regulatory guidelines are passed, and by the fact that these 
regulations are mostly taken at face value. It is sometimes the case that unofficial or implicit 
regulation, or even a quasi-regulation, is in fact more powerful that the official and explicit one. 
There are hardly any tools available to address this problem in a methodologically rigorous 
manner. One of the ideas, however, might be to inspect how investment limits influence the 
actual allocations to a given asset class. If the actually realized allocation to, say, equities is 39.5 
percent with a regulatory cap of 40 percent, an inference may be made that the regulation is 
material. If the realized allocation is e.g. 20 percent, the materiality factor shrinks.  
The unprecedented share of pension fund wealth in global assets, and the vital impact the 
profitability of these investments exerts over the lives of many prospective pensioners, still calls 
for a thorough study. Pension funds exert profound influence on the market and also fulfill 
crucial social role while managing enormous wealth of individuals. It is of everyone’s interest 
that these funds are invested as effectively as possible. The question of whether alternative 
securities prove their potential to boost pension plans’ financial standing is subject to an extended 
scrutiny in the consecutive versions of this paper. The article itself constitutes a preliminary 
research in a sense that there are numerous follow-ups that might be pursued on its foundations. 
This paper is intentionally crafted to facilitate further steps in terms of comparing the current 
risk-return profile of selected portfolios with hypothetical portfolios that include currently 
prohibited or restricted financial instruments. 
It is obvious that this paper is an invitation to further work either in the field of methodology or in 
the realm of improved theoretical insights. The following has to be done in particular: 
 Developing new variables for unlisted equity cap and unlisted bonds cap that are more 
differentiating between countries than overall limits on equity and bonds. 
 Introducing a dummy variable to distinguish defined benefit and defined contribution 
plans, since as Davis (2001, 17) underlines the regulatory approach is fundamentally different, 
since the former have a guarantee component and more resemble a life insurance, whereas the 
latter more resemble mutual funds. 
 Introducing several other controls to better explain the heterogeneity of returns, although 
given limited number of observations, the set of controls will rather be modest. 
 Including more factors for the sake of verifying if funds are achieving alpha returns. 
 Better match the regulatory regime to the performance figures for countries with multiple 
funds within the framework of one system. 
 Create virtual alternative portfolios to check its influence on overall return. Some 
technical remarks were provided e.g. by Schweizer (2008). 
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Appendix: The approach to the assessment of regulatory strictness 
The table features the rules governing the value of penalty ascribed to reviewed jurisdictions. 
Value of penalty: 0 0.5 1 
Portfolio ceilings for broad asset classes 
Equity 
No limits or limits down to 80% for at least one 
sub-class (e.g. listed equity), with none of sub-
classes (e.g. unlisted equity) being entirely 
prohibited 
Allowed, but 
limited in a 
way stricter 
than in the left 
column; some 
of sub-classes 
may be 
prohibited 
Each of the 
sub-classes is 
not allowed, 
apart from 
rare or 
unusual 
exceptions 
Real estate 
No limits or limits down to 20% for at least one 
sub-class (e.g. mortgage-backed securities), with 
none of sub-classes (e.g. direct investment) 
being entirely prohibited 
Bonds 
No limits or limits down to 80% for at least one 
sub-class (e.g. unlisted bonds), with none of sub-
classes (e.g. corporate bonds) being entirely 
prohibited 
Retail investment 
funds No limits or limits down to 20% for at least one 
sub-class, with none of sub-classes being 
entirely prohibited 
Private investment 
funds 
Loans
9
 
Bank deposits 
No limits or limits down to 80% for at least one 
sub-class, with none of sub-classes being 
entirely prohibited 
Global investment 
limit in foreign 
assets 
There is no limit or the limit is negligible (down 
to 60%), with all asset classes allowed and with 
none of geographies being excluded 
Allowed 
globally with 
a limit up to 
60%, or some 
asset classes 
restricted, or 
some 
geographies 
restricted 
Investing in 
foreign assets 
is prohibited, 
apart from 
rare or 
unusual 
exceptions 
 
A way to improve the statistics would be to include a dedicated sub-category for infrastructure, as 
the trend of greater allocation is forthcoming (Della Croce 2012; Della Croce, Schieb, and 
Stevens 2011; Towers Watson 2012).  
                                                          
9
 The regulatory data displayed in the column “Loans” was not precise enough for its inclusion in the model. Some 
jurisdictions understand this asset class as the ability to invest in collateralized loan obligations or similar securitized 
loan-related instruments, whereas the other interpret it simply as the facility to issue loans using fund’s money, e.g. 
to individuals being pension plan members. 
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In order to give a glimpse on how the process is carried out, two out of the most complex 
examples are described below: 
Hungary (2012) 
Asset class Equity Real estate Bonds Retail 
investment 
funds 
Private 
investment 
funds 
Bank 
deposits 
Global 
investment 
limit in 
foreign 
assets 
Description 
of limits 
Listed 
equities: 
No limit. 
Non-listed 
equities: 
5% (both 
domestic 
and 
foreign). 
Conventio-
nal 
portfolio: 
max. 10%. 
Balanced 
portfolio: 
min. 10%, 
max. 40%. 
Growth 
portfolio: 
min. 40%. 
Mandatory 
pension 
funds 
(MPF): 5% 
directly, 
10% 
together 
with real 
estate 
investment 
funds. 
Voluntary 
pension 
funds 
(VPF): 
10% 
directly or 
through 
real estate 
investment 
funds. 
Conventio-
nal 
portfolio: 
0%. 
Balanced 
portfolio: 
max. 10%. 
Growth 
portfolio: 
max. 20%. 
Governm. 
bonds: No 
limit. 
Hungarian 
corporate 
bonds: 
10%. 
Hungarian 
municipal 
bonds: 
10%. 
Mortgage 
bonds: 
25%. 
No limit. Derivative 
fund: 5%. 
Risk 
capital: 
5%. 
Conventio-
nal 
portfolio: 0 
%. 
Balanced 
portfolio: 
max. 3%, 
max. 2% 
per issuer. 
Growth 
portfolio: 
max 5%, 
max 2% 
per issuer. 
Listed: No 
limit. 
Within 
investment 
made 
abroad, the 
ratio of 
investment 
in non-
OECD 
countries 
shall not 
exceed 
20%. 
Penalty 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 
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Mexico (2012) 
Asset class Equity Real estate Bonds Retail 
investment 
funds 
Private 
investment 
funds 
Bank 
deposits 
Global 
investment 
limit in 
foreign 
assets 
Description 
of limits 
No limit. 
30% in 
securities 
not 
admitted to 
trading on 
a regulated 
market. 
30% (joint 
limit with 
mortgage 
loans). In a 
unique real 
estate will 
be a 10% 
and in a 
real estate 
UCIT a 
20%. 
No limit. 
30% in 
bonds not 
admitted to 
trading on 
a regulated 
market. 
No limit 
(whenever 
UCITs 
satisfy 
legal 
require-
ments). 
Individually 
20% (if 
UCITs). 
 
30% in 
private 
investment 
funds 
(indivi-
dually 2%). 
Exception: 
investment 
funds that 
invest in 
other 
investment 
funds (this 
exception 
is not 
applicable 
to Spanish 
private 
investment 
funds). 
No limit. 
Indivi-
dually 
20% (joint 
limit with 
every asset 
issued by 
the same 
entity). 
No limit. 
Penalty 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
This approach proves its superiority over Boon et al. (2013), as it is tolerant towards limits set at 
reasonable levels. None of the asset classes above were awarded a maximum penalty of 1.0. In a 
binary assessment system developed by Boon et al., most of the above asset classes were 
probably punished. 
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Table 1. 
Data summary. 
 Variable Description Unit Source 
1 
sharpe_ratio, 
sharpe_ratio_2 
Sharpe ratio of pension funds’ nominal 
investment returns in a given jurisdiction 
in a given year. Two versions of Sharpe 
ratios were calculated that differ in how 
volatility was measured.
10
 
pure 
number 
Own calculation 
2 sortino_ratio 
Sortino ratio of pension funds’ nominal 
investment returns in a given jurisdiction 
for the previous three years.
11
 
pure 
number 
3 reg_agg_1 
Synthetic variable indicating a magnitude 
of limiting investments considered 
risky.
12
 
pure 
number OECD, own 
interpretation 
4 reg_agg_2 
Synthetic variable indicating a magnitude 
of limiting investments considered safe.
13
 
pure 
number 
5 aec 
Dummy for an advanced economy, as 
reported by the International Monetary 
Fund 
dummy IMF 
6 recession 
A dummy that adopts 1 if GDP growth is 
negative. 
dummy World Bank 
7 risk_free_rate 
Long-term interest rate, 10-year 
government bonds in most cases. 
percent OECD in most cases 
8 equity_mkt 
Annual change in S&P Global Equity 
Indices that measures price change in the 
stock markets. 
percent 
World Bank 
9 turnover 
A proxy for market liquidity: turnover 
ratio is the total value of shares traded 
during the period divided by the average 
market capitalization for the period. 
percent 
 
  
                                                          
10
 Precisely, the volatility in Sharpe ratio I is computed as the standard deviation of nominal investment returns 
reported for the previous three years. For the first two years in a sample, a standard deviation of the third year in the 
sample is used. The volatility in Sharpe ratio II is the standard deviation of all available investment returns in a 
sample, exactly what Boon et al. (2013) have proposed. It is thus less accurate than Sharpe ratio I, but more 
instructive about the long-term tendency. 
11
 For Sortino ratio, first two years in a sample are lost. 
12
 In essence, the goal of both synthetic variables was to compute a compound “nuisance factor” being a numerical 
representation of restrictions identified in a particular jurisdiction. In other words, the analysis ranks particular 
regimes according to the nuisance conveyed by them when it comes to asset allocation. Again, it is evident that 
quantitative restrictions are just a single element of the regulatory mosaic, and the actual regulatory burden may 
differ significantly from what the quantitative caps indicate. 
13
 cf. footnote above. 
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Table 2. 
Descriptive statistics of individual data series. 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis Obs 
sharpe_ratio -0.1646 0.2337 24.0719 -30.2632 4.8175 -1.1439 17.2835 252 
sharpe_ratio_2 -0.3097 0.2008 2.6286 -8.3894 1.6712 -1.9375 7.8032 258 
sortino_ratio 0.0480 0.0250 2.8256 -0.9962 0.6174 1.0622 5.7393 190 
reg_agg_1 <0;4> 0.9147 0.7500 4.0000 0.0000 0.9559 1.1733 3.8808 296 
reg_agg_2 <0;2> 0.1474 0.0000 0.5000 0.0000 0.2283 0.8999 1.8099 329 
aec 0.7672 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4233 -1.2643 2.5984 335 
recession 0.1459 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.3535 2.0062 5.0250 329 
risk_free_rate 5.1998 4.6950 45.000 -0.1000 3.4529 5.8240 58.7084 334 
equity_mkt 10.7554 14.8044 113.2000 -69.9427 33.6887 -0.1475 3.0449 311 
turnover 78.1490 71.4030 269.8216 0.3527 50.5842 0.6743 3.2036 329 
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Table 3.  
Regression results with Sharpe ratio (based on the 3-year volatility) as the dependent variable. 
 Dependent variable: Sharpe ratio I 
(1) (2) (3) 
intercept 
-1.00 ** 
(0.47) 
-1.00 ** 
(0.48) 
0.47 
(1.55) 
reg_agg_1 
0.88 ** 
(0.41) 
0.98 ** 
(0.54) 
0.77 
(0.63) 
reg_agg_2  
-0.53 
(1.89) 
0.46 
(1.95) 
aec   
1.00 
(1.09) 
recession   
-0.81 
(0.88) 
risk_free_rate   
-0.121 
(0. 141) 
equity_mkt   
0.0266 *** 
(0.0101) 
turnover   
-0.0221 *** 
(0.0073) 
n 226 226 214 
R
2
 0.0203 0.0207 0.1062 
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Table 4. 
Regression results with Sharpe ratio (based on the all-sample volatility) as the dependent 
variable. 
 Dependent variable: Sharpe ratio II 
(1) (2) (3) 
intercept 
-0.595 *** 
(0.164) 
-0.596 *** 
(0.164) 
0.34 
(0.48) 
reg_agg_1 
0.233 * 
(0.141) 
0.178 
(0.185) 
0.114 
(0.198) 
reg_agg_2  
0.29 
(0.65) 
0.56 
(0.61) 
aec   
-0.01 
(0.34) 
recession   
-0.04 
(0.28) 
risk_free_rate   
-0.129 *** 
(0.044) 
equity_mkt   
-0.0189 *** 
(0.0032) 
turnover   
-0.0061 *** 
(0.0023) 
n 226 226 214 
R
2
 0.0121 0.0130 0.2373 
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Table 5. 
Regression results with Sortino ratio as the dependent variable. 
 Dependent variable: Sortino ratio 
(1) (2) (3) 
intercept 
0.021 
(0.069) 
0.020 
(0.069) 
-0.22 
(0.21) 
reg_agg_1 
0.019 
(0.064) 
0.020 
(0.089) 
0.042 
(0.100) 
reg_agg_2 
 -0.01 
(0.29) 
-0.26 
(0.29) 
aec 
  -0.043 
(0.147) 
recession 
  -0.267 ** 
(0.117) 
risk_free_rate 
  0.0199 
(0.0184) 
equity_mkt 
  0.00442 *** 
(0.00135) 
turnover 
  0.00237 ** 
(0.00097) 
n 172 172 163 
R
2
 0.0005 0.0005 0.1250 
 
 
